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Abstract. 
In South Africa, with upward mobility much aspired-to but seldom attained, householders 
must spend money they have not yet earned. Borrowing both from formal institutions and 
smaller moneylenders (legal and illegal) positions them uneasily: in order to fulfill social 
requirements in one register, they acquire intensified obligations in another. Moneylending 
and money borrowing, owing much to the legacies of “credit apartheid”, involve an uneven 
mix. Embeddedness and community connection enable flexibility, juggling, and temporary 
escape from repayment obligations, on the one hand. Systems of repayment and ever-newer 
technologies enable creditors to pursue debtors with inexorable swiftness, on the other. Given 
that credit post-apartheid has an increasingly formal, uniform, and financialized character, the 
second of these – which makes debtors get “deeper into a hole” – is becoming a predominant 
way of experiencing and representing the situation. The term, with its suggestion of 
entrapment, captures an important aspect of the deeply ambivalent feelings that borrowers 
experience in the face of debt.  
 
The three elements of the present volume – hope, value and crisis – are inextricably 
combined in the phenomenon which is the topic of this paper: that is, debt. In South Africa, 
the moment of democracy coincided with the extension of credit to many who were formerly 
unable to borrow. It held out the promise and expectation of inclusion to people formerly 
denied it. As elsewhere in the world, but here beginning in a more precipitous manner, the 
supply of and demand for credit interacted in a complex relationship to facilitate the rapid 
growth of a new middle class, as well as promising the fulfilment of aspiration to a far larger 
group of people (Servet and Saiag 2011). As prospective consumers enthusiastically 
embraced the possibility of borrowing in order to secure highly-valued things, opportunities 
and relationships, credit also started being “sold”— 
just as happened elsewhere (see Villareal, this volume)—to prospective takers as necessary or 
inevitable, drawing yet further numbers into the net. Such credit was being used not simply 
for materialist consumerism, but to satisfy the desire for what was felt necessary for a good 
life. When the lure of credit turned into unpayable debt, many of those initially offered hopes 
of advance —aspiring to possess those things formerly reserved for people wealthier than 
themselves—were threatened with further marginalization. Fearful of the unsustainable and 
crisis-like character of the situation, policy makers and analysts, several years before the 
“sub-prime” debacle in the US, were devising a regulatory framework to tackle the problem.  
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Exploring the circumstances which gave rise to their alarm, this paper also gives attention to 
models used by local actors to assess and evaluate their present and future circumstances. 
Local ideas of worth may challenge the tendency to measure all value by—and demand 
repayment in —its universal equivalent, money (Hann and Hart 2011:49), and considering 
such ideas ought to help us contest analyses which seek to represent all economic matters by 
measuring them in purely contractual or terms. Considering debt in this way potentially 
directs the emphasis away from uniform measures of value and towards diverse ones. But in 
settings like South Africa where financialization is far advanced (Ardington et al 2004; 
Barchiesi 2011; Daniels 2004; Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004; Schoombee 2004; 2009),
1
 the 
imperative to repay may become less easy to escape.   
 
Debt gives a particularly poignant and edgy character to hope. It also throws value into 
question by threatening impending future crisis. If there has been a proliferation of the things 
that are felt essential in order to actualize the kind of life aspired to, then buying them “on 
tick” is often the only way forward. In doing so, the debtor can “borrow speculative resources 
from his/her own future and transform them into concrete resources to be used in the present” 
(Peebles 2010:226). The way debt links these two time-frames together means that positive 
and negative ideas of worth may be forced into uncomfortable juxtaposition. The values 
associated with getting what one needs to live well may be unassailably desirable, and loans 
may make it possible to actualize that life in the here and now, but owing amounts that 
threaten to increase exponentially as one looks towards the future can also bring anxiety, 
opprobrium and self-blame.  
 
Conducting research on the sensitive topic of indebtedness, as I did between 2007 and 2009, 
posed particular challenges, given that people were reluctant to discuss personal finances or 
engage in conversation about the illegal moneylending that is pervasive in South Africa. 
Faced with such circumspection, I found circumspection to be the best remedy in turn. Stories 
about moneylenders, “scams” practiced by repossession agents, and the like, were readily 
offered, and people were more willing to give insights into their own and their families’ 
histories of banking, spending or saving money than to recount the details of their current 
financial situation. It also proved necessary to explore a variety of settings, locales and types 
of actors. Firstly, given that the ranks of those who aspire to join the new middle class far 
outnumber those included on the grounds of income and achievement, and are to be found in 
both rural and urban settings, I undertook interview-based research and participant 
observation not only among medium—to well-paid employees of the government; but also in 
a low—to middle-income neighbourhood of Soweto (Gauteng) and in Impalahoek village in 
Mpumalanga (Figures 1 and 2). Secondly, given the need to move beyond specific locales 
and attend to policy issues and the pronouncements of agents in the state, the corporate 
sector, and the world of human rights and non-governmental organisations, I also interviewed 
employees in the banking sector and registered microlenders, as well as being attentive to 
those who seek to regulate or curb their activities, in particular by talking to debt counselors 
and sitting in on sessions they held with their clients, in Pretoria and Midrand (Gauteng) (Fig 
2). For the project overall (James 2014) I worked with 73 recorded and transcribed interviews 
as well using fieldnotes written during participant observation. While some informants sought 
anonymity, others were happy to be cited, and I have respected their wishes. 
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  Figure 1: Map of South Africa 
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   Figure 2: Map of Gauteng 
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The rise and regulation of reckless lending 
In South Africa, circumstances have combined to place borrowers more inexorably in the grip 
of lenders than they have in some of the other settings discussed here (Guerin, this volume; 
Villareal, this volume). Soon after the transition from apartheid to democracy brought new 
promises of prosperity and upward mobility for those previously dispossessed, rates of 
borrowing and lending are reported to have increased exponentially, as black consumers took 
advantage of the credit opportunities they had previously been denied, while particular 
sectors of the white community started micro-lending businesses to cater to and exploit this 
new market.
2
 Demonstrating what was to become its characteristic combination of 
neoliberalism and regulatory tendencies, the state—whose policies, during the 1990s, had 
initially enabled such developments by liberalizing the economy and the provision of credit 
in one fell swoop—then sought, during the 2000s, to outlaw “reckless lending” and regulate 
the negative effects of this borrowing by passing new legislation, the National Credit Act of 
2007 (NCA).  
 
Resulting from these impulses that followed each other in short order, and exhibiting varying 
degrees of legal formality, three distinct lending sectors were in evidence by the late 2000s. 
Each, supplementing or plugging gaps left by the other two, supplied this new market in its 
own way. Reflecting the ethnic and racial divisions of South Africa’s past and of its new 
dispensation, each has a linguistic/ethnic specificity (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Credit supply  
 
Sector Lender Type of loan 
1 Mainstream/formal financial sector 
(English-speaking capitalists)   
Bank loans; store cards for clothing 
and food; vehicle finance; furniture and 
appliances on instalments; housing 
loans 
 
2 New microlending sector  
(Afrikaans-speaking former civil 
servants) 
 
Smaller/short-term loans 
 
3 Informal microlending sector  
(neighborhood moneylenders – 
mashonisas in black townships and 
villages) 
Smaller/short-term loans  
 
 
(1) The mainstream/formal financial sector was historically dominated by an “oligopoly” of 
British-owned banks and rooted in the English-speaking capitalist sector (Verhoef 2009:157; 
181), and later by the “big four” banks—ABSA, First National (FNB), Nedbank, Standard. 
Alongside the credit cards, housing loans and vehicle finance they offer, the sector also 
provides retailers’ store cards for clothing and food, hire-purchase for furniture and 
appliances, and the like. Black people, having had very restricted access to such loans before 
the 1990s under credit apartheid, were offered them in profusion thereafter.  
(2) The new micro-lending sector, offering mostly smaller and short-term loans, grew 
exponentially in the 1990s and was mostly run by Afrikaans-speaking former civil servants 
who invested their redundancy packages in these businesses. They did so after leaving state 
employ when the ANC became the ruling party. Initially free to charge “uncapped” interest 
rates, and engaging in practices—such as the confiscation and use of borrowers’ ATM cards 
by way of loan security—that were later prohibited, many of these subsequently registered as 
micro-lenders under the act, which obliged them to charge monthly interest of no more than 
44%. Some of the smaller micro-lenders consolidated to form larger enterprises, notably 
African Bank and Capitec, which have now taken their place alongside the “big four”. 
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(3) Mashonisas or neighborhood moneylenders
3
 came to be defined by their contrast to their 
formal micro-lending counterpart (2): they were defined as loan sharks because they 
remained unregistered under the act. (Since borrowers are often ignorant of the regulations, 
some use the term, however, to refer to both registered and unregistered lenders). The biggest 
operators among them use customers’ ATM cards to withdraw the money owed to them at 
month end before returning them to their owners, and typically charge monthly interest of 
50%, in excess of the new cap on the interest rate imposed by the act. In this classically 
financialized manner, taking advantage of efforts that had been made to bank the unbanked, 
some community moneylenders were ensuring repayment by using the ATM technique 
earlier deployed, but now outlawed for use, by those who were now registered (and hence 
considered “formal” and “regulated”). 
 
What of the demand side? Overall, it is black consumers striving to overcome the imbalances 
of apartheid whose plight has underlain the attempted regulation. Analyses showed that 
salary—or wage-earning consumers were most likely to be over-indebted. Echoing what 
happens in many other settings of stable salaries subjected to less-than-stable pressures (see 
Parry 2012), “these workers earn a regular salary” and therefore “qualify for credit, but 
binding expenditure constraints possibly places pressure on them to borrow at a level that is 
unsustainable” (Daniels 2004:842). Race, here, is not a defining feature. Indeed, by 2008 it 
became clear that white consumers owed more than black ones.
4
  But those whose “reckless 
borrowing” has been of most concern—not surprisingly, since its members have also had the 
greatest electoral and political influence since the advent of democracy —are the black 
recipients of state salaries (nurses, teachers, policemen) in the “new” black middle class 
where public sector employment predominates (Crankshaw 2005; Schlemmer 2005, Southall 
2004), middle—to low-wage black employees in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and a 
larger category, subjected to more “precarious” circumstances since democracy (Barchiesi 
2011), which has similar aspirations but even fewer means to fulfill these.
5
 While I have 
written more fully about the new middle class elsewhere (James 2014), the principle case 
study on which the present paper centres—that of a security guard employed on a casual 
basis—hails from the ranks of this increasingly growing “precariat” (Standing 2011).  
 
If debt involves the obligation to repay the resources borrowed from one’s own future 
(Peebles 2010:226), the South African case is distinguished from others in this volume by a 
gradual shrinking of the options for temporarily evading this. The co-existence of multiple 
registers of wealth, partly overlapping and/or commensurable but partly remaining distinct, is 
a common topic in economic anthropology (Gudeman 2001; Parry and Bloch 1989). Villareal 
(this volume) shows how Mexican women use “diverse frameworks of calculation and 
valuation”, and Guerin (this volume) speaks of the “incommensurable, non-substitutable 
financial practices” that are commonly used to cope with tensions arising from “the multiple 
logics of debt”.  In South Africa, similar arrangements have certainly been and still are 
engaged in, alternately to hinder and enable the flow of money, alternately to enable saving 
and spending, but the possibilities of “juggling” various options (Guerin, this volume; Servet 
and Saiag 2013) are fewer than they were. This is so, despite the proliferation of new sources 
of credit since the end of apartheid. Choosing from among the three sectors identified above, 
a consumer is able to (1) borrow from many banks, use many credit cards, and hold 
storecards from an array of retailers, as well as having access to micro-loans both (2) 
legal/formal and (3) illegal/informal (Fig 3). (Often, as with Guerin’s paper, they borrow 
from the latter in order to pay back the former). At the same time, the means by which these 
debts are collected has shrunk drastically. Considerable efforts made—with the help of the 
UK’s DfID-funded Finmark Trust —to “bank the unbanked” (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004: 
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89) have seen a deepening financialization of the economy (Ardington et al 2004; Krige 
2012). Accompanying this, there are advanced IT systems rooted in apartheid’s 
preoccupation with surveillance, which envision, even if they have not yet achieved, a single 
hi-tech system to be used for identification, cashing in social grants, buying and banking 
(Breckenridge 2005: 272-3). These technologies, enabling “data to flow from one contiguous 
database to another”, have opened up the commercial use of such data (Breckenridge 
2005:281).
6
 What worries debtors most about these developments is their application in 
transforming what were distinct pockets of finance into one single flow. By allowing lenders, 
formal and informal, to reach into borrowers’ bank accounts by the means mentioned earlier, 
their inclusion in this hi-tech banking system leaves such borrowers, in effect, less place to 
hide. Sources of credit, then, have proliferated and become more diverse, but the technologies 
of collection have narrowed and become streamlined. 
    
In the face of these developments, the NCA, although informed by a conviction that lenders 
should be held to account (see Shipton 2011:232), ended up more often being used to reform 
borrowers. The act admittedly achieved some small successes: curtailing mortgage credit well 
before, and hence preventing a South African occurrence of, the sub-prime crisis; and 
establishing a system of debt review.
7
 The moral/legal framework it established made it 
possible, as in the case of Richard Madihlaba discussed below, to persuade certain creditors 
to accept some culpability and even to write off debts. But this was possible only in the 
relatively rare cases where an independently-funded and skilled adviser was willing to 
commit much time and effort. In many other cases, debt counselors’ efforts—alongside those 
by other state and non-state actors—were directed towards the end of educating debtors and 
persuading them to be more frugal.  Self-help books and self-styled financial advisors were 
aiming at getting consumers to “own” their finances, to partner up in a stable nuclear family, 
focus on the future achievements and needs of one’s own children, and repudiate the claims 
of kinsmen and neighbors, advising people, in classically neoliberal style, to refuse others’ 
demands (Ndumo 2011: 195-6; see also Stack 2013).
8
   
 
Overall, lending and borrowing, at rates regarded as “reckless”, were continuing apace. When 
I was writing this in 2013, 6 years after the promulgation of the NCA, the media were 
reporting on the notorious case of the shooting of striking platinum mineworkers at Marikana. 
It turned out that one important underlying cause of the strike had been the intensified 
onslaught lenders were making on borrowers’ bank accounts. The miners, not necessarily in 
the lowest pay bracket, had unsustainable levels of debt. An additional feature making this 
doubly burdensome, indeed intolerable, was the manner in which their numerous creditors 
were ensuring repayments. Miners’ pay, automatically transferred into their bank accounts at 
month end, was being transferred out of these again with equal ease by those to whom they 
owed money. These deductions were made in various ways. Lenders in sectors (1) and (2) 
used direct debits or “garnishee” or emoluments attachment orders. These are orders granted 
by a magistrate or clerk of the court and served on the employer of a defaulting debtor, 
enabling a creditor to take a monthly repayment directly from that debtor’s salary. Lenders in 
(3) did the equivalent by keeping borrowers’ ATM cards and using these to withdraw funds 
with interest from the ATM at month end.  Shortly after payday, many of these miners had 
simply had nothing left to live on. (Fig 3).
9
 
 
Despite regulation, then, the story told here is one of continuing, even deepening, 
indebtedness.  
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Local models of indebtedness 
 
The outline above, by emphasizing the crisis-like character of borrowing and lending, gives a 
South African take on a familiar story.
10
 But how do borrower informants – including those 
newly indebted —experience the situation? A review of the small and incremental ways they 
save, invest and husband resources, or convert by choice between different registers of value, 
complements the narrow view, through the lens of deferred-payment-with-interest, taken by 
economists, regulators and policy-makers (Ardington et al 2004; Daniels 2004). Informants’ 
models provide a more local, “house”-centred, or “human” view (Gudeman 2001; 2010; this 
volume; Hart et al 2010). They yield a view of mutual obligations between persons, families 
and generations that is akin to the holding of wealth on behalf of others that Shipton calls 
“entrustment” (2007), and similar to the view outlined in the introduction to this volume. 
 
In post-1994 South Africa, such ideas articulate “market” and “community” models 
(Gudeman 2001), reflecting a long history of proletarianisation and commodification on the 
one hand and custom-based social solidarity on the other. Embodying the former, sekoloto 
(from the Afrikaans skuld; debt) has negative connotations of perpetual enslavement that hark 
back to rural cultivators’ experiences of owing money to trading stores and, more recently, 
refer to their sense of entrapment in hire-purchase arrangements. Embodying the latter, lobola 
captures the idea of long-term obligation and reciprocity between families (James 2012:22-3; 
Kuper 1982).  In classic Maussian style it includes the payment of bridewealth from a 
groom’s to a bride’s family, gifts from the bride’s to the groom’s family in return, and 
trousseau-type items given by parents to a daughter on the occasion of marriage: a model that 
is tenacious and resilient in the contemporary mind (Krige 2012, White 2004; 2010).
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Combined with this, and with similar tenacity, a further aspect of local social solidarity 
centres on saving. People club together in stokvels with relatives or neighbours to husband 
their resources (Bähre 2007, Verhoef 2002) —circumscribing these to prevent their everyday 
use, often by investing money in particular goods.
12
 The two models, rather than remaining 
discrete, have over the years been forced into articulation when slender means make it 
necessary to “borrow speculative resources … from [the] future” (Peebles 2010:226).  The 
resulting attitude is one of deep ambivalence: it conjoins the alienation and enslavement of 
commodified indebtedness with the close bonds of obligation and reciprocity entailed in 
“entrustment” (Shipton 2007).  
 
An example illustrates the difficulties arising from the juxtaposition of these divergent 
spheres of value. The story of Richard Madihlaba—a sePedi-speaking rurally-based migrant, 
employed as a security guard in Pretoria, whose home is in GaNchabeleng, Limpopo 
Province (Fig. 1)—exemplifies the situation of those who qualify for credit by earning a 
regular income (if, in his case, a precarious one), and whose aspirations to a decent lifestyle 
far outstrip their earnings. When I met him in 2008 he was being given debt counseling by 
Mareesa Erasmus of the University of Pretoria Law Clinic.
13
  As I listened, a tale unfolded of 
almost unimaginable exposure to consumer credit for one with so few resources. Coming 
under pressure from his mother “to pay lobola before she died” for the mother of his three 
children, he borrowed “more than R5,000” from African Bank, which he was still paying off.  
Since such marriage payments are thought to entail long-term owing in and of themselves, 
borrowing money in order to make them is considered undesirable – but grooms, faced with 
demands from in-laws or their own families, will nonetheless do so when pressed. Further 
demonstrating his commitment to long-term conjugal relations and to the local solidarity 
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economy, Richard and his cohort of home-based migrant men formed a savings club, 
Rekgonne (We can) with the aim of paying for the substantial costs of a wedding, above and 
beyond the lobola itself, for each member in turn. Members’ cash contributions are R100 
monthly, with a larger amount of R1,000 payable on the occasion of each member’s 
celebration. 
 
These various commitments have both necessitated, and are accumulating on top of, others 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Richard Madihlaba’s credit portfolio14 
 
Sector Lender Amount/purpose 
1 Standard Bank account with overdraft facility 
African Bank* 
Jet 
Retail Credit Solutions (RCS) 
 
R5,000 for lobola 
R6,000 for children’s clothes 
R2,800 for family’s DVD player 
2 Onecorps 
SA loans 
R2,800 for own DVD player 
To pay back other loans 
 
* African bank started as an enterprise in Sector 2, grew exponentially, and can now be considered part of the main stream.
  
 
In his case, as in many others, it was his conscientious repayment of initial loans that led to 
his being offered further credit. After he repaid his initial loan to Jet, the retailer extended 
him a second, larger loan. But his debts eventually caught up with him. The final loan, from 
micro-lender SA Loans, taken out in order to repay the other loans, involved “borrowing 
money from someone – SA Loans —who charges 360% interest to pay back someone – RCS 
—who charges 100%”, so Richard is getting “much deeper into a hole”, as Mareesa put it.  
 
Richard showed characteristic ambivalence about the effect of his many loans, and the 
investments for which they were intended, on the long-term relationships which lie at their 
heart. It was in order to procure the basis of household stability that he had borrowed money 
to pay lobola, to further his own and his children’s education, and to buy clothes and material 
goods for the household. He had also sent money home for building supplies, hoping to start 
building his own house on his residential stand in his home village. His actions were the very 
essence of frugality and thrift – the opposite of the “profligate consumer” of which much has 
been written in the media (see Krige 2011:294 passim). But broader conditions were 
restricting the success of his venture. His wife was spending the money he remitted on things 
other than those he had envisaged, and had absented herself, leaving the children to be cared 
for by her mother, who he felt was neglecting them.  What he termed his “financial situation” 
had a bearing on these conjugal disturbances: “I once brought her my bank statement, telling 
her ‘I have a problem. People are debiting the money from my account. That is why I am not 
getting that much money. I have been working in security. And I have to pay some of the 
accounts, like Jet, and those accounts that I have to pay by hand’…. Maybe she [my wife] 
was expecting me to be a rich man, buying her expensive clothes.” 
 
While marrying and paying lobola, alongside group-based savings also oriented toward 
marriage, were thus crucial to Richard’s inserting himself securely within the local solidarity 
economy, these things required the incurring of so much debt (sekoloto) that they were 
threatening to undermine that very security, and indeed the house-based arrangements on 
which it was supposed to be based.  
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Local views of indebtedness thus combine two aspects. The positive character of house-
centred aspirations to save and to fulfill long-term social obligations, on the one hand, 
articulate uneasily with negative experiences of the financialized arrangements these 
necessitate and without which they would prove impossible—of being hounded by creditors, 
taking out further loans, and being driven “deeper into a hole” —on the other.  
 
Credit, banking and moneylending: the longer view 
 
Behind the bank accounts and overdrafts Richard Madihlaba used, and the micro-loans and 
array of goods for whose purchase he had got himself into debt, lies a longer history of 
constraint. “Credit apartheid” or the “dual economy of credit” are the terms that have been 
used to characterize the forms of exclusion suffered by people like him. For the past half-
century, black people’s access to credit, tenuous from the beginning, had become even further 
restricted. Principle among the factors underpinning this was a “dual economy” of land 
ownership, with opportunities for buying and selling real estate (and the procuring of 
mortgages), and chances to borrowing for business and enterprise, severely restricted or non-
existent (Krige 2011; James 2014).
15
 The primary form of credit that had been available was 
that offered by furniture and appliance retailers via the system of hire purchase (Kaplan 
1986:168), alongside a smaller element of clothing purchased on credit by wealthier and 
more upwardly mobile blacks from the 1950s onwards (Kaplan 1986:270).  Practices of 
borderline legality which had been habitually used by such retailers in their dealings with 
black clients were themselves further evidence of “credit apartheid”. (Indeed, it was anxiety 
about these consumer credit practices that had prompted the investigations which eventually 
led to the passing of the NCA (DTI 2002; 2004).) As Richard’s story shows, some aspects of 
this habituated system were beginning to change. In his credit “portfolio”, overdrafts, store 
cards and micro-loans predominated over hire purchase agreements. This apparent shift in 
technology and formal terminology, however, obscures that the lender was ultimately the 
same. Large retail firms, both clothing—and furniture-based, had started diversified into the 
lucrative micro-lending market in the 1990s. Richard had borrowed from one of these, RCS, 
part of the Foschini clothing empire, to buy his DVD player (Fig 4). If the variety of financial 
strategies was gradually narrowing down to become more uniform for the borrower, on the 
side of the lender the divisions between distinct retail products was blurred. A uniform 
measure —of “debts” to be recouped through bank accounts —was replacing these. 
 
Furniture and hire purchase 
 
Investing in items of furniture and appliances, both to embellish houses and as an investment 
in a fixed asset where other forms of property were disallowed, was a key aspect of the black 
South African experience, especially from the 1950s onwards. Pioneered in urban areas by 
town-dwellers seeking respectability (Krige 2011: 138, 172), the practice readily spread to 
rural areas. Where migrants had initially taken a conservative approach to investment in 
property and the purchase of material goods, often consolidating the wealth of the homestead 
by buying cattle (Ferguson 1992), those migrating more recently have tended to favour the 
purchase-on-credit of household furnishings. A bride’s parents often provided an item of 
furniture as part of her trousseau, later investing in further items, paying each off in turn, with 
the eventual aim of equipping all rooms in the house. Although interest rates were and remain 
high (Schreiner et al 1997), typically more than doubling the price, many householders have 
kept up their repayments in a prudent fashion. Furniture purchase thus contributed to a 
ritualized life-course as well as involving aspirations to sophistication and modernity. It 
exposed householders to gradually increasing expenditure, and expanding credit access, over 
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time. Providing a means of “saving” money by making it unavailable for other things, it 
could also however, when unregulated, lead to unsustainable levels of debt. 
 
The high price and the two-year period of time between delivery of the goods and the final 
repayment gave this credit system its mixture of different styles. There was meticulous record 
keeping and mailing out of invoices in brown envelopes to remind purchasers of what they 
still owed, but trust was also important: the social and geographical distance between retailers 
and their customers in villages made the business reliant on intermediaries and lent it a 
personalised dimension. Considerable profits could be made from by targeting low-paid black 
migrants, but relying on these buyers, with their low earnings and – in some cases —
reluctance to keep up repayments, also exposed smaller retailers to financial risk. The high 
costs of hire-purchase compensated for defaults and helped pay for repossession operations. 
Success in making money in this sector (despite these problems) attracted much competition 
(Tlali 1979:26,  30, 116), which made business owners increasingly determined to increase 
their profit margins over those of their rivals while simultaneously reducing what they paid to 
employees and agents.  
Customers who might have fallen on hard times, when handed reminders of payment due, 
often threw them away or hid them under the bed, only to endure the shame of having items 
repossessed. The alternative – showing that “trust” was often honoured more in the breach 
than the observance – was that some clients entered into collusion with agents or paid them 
bribes to depart (Cohen 2004:42-6; Tlali 1979:82-3). From the customers' perspective, this 
was one way to escape the high interest rates charged. But such efforts did not necessarily 
make matters easier for customers. One such agent in an Mpumalanga village, despite having 
been fired by the retailer for crooked practice, continued to travel around to prospective 
customers, taking advantage of villagers’ ignorance of his dismissal and continuing to pocket 
the deposits they were paying in expectation that their furniture would be delivered. The 
errant agent later left the area to go into hiding in order to escape their wrath once villagers 
discovered his trickery (James 2014).  
 
 
By the early 2000s, despite banks' efforts to abolish credit apartheid by extending financial 
formalisation to all sectors of society, journalist and author David Cohen maintained that the 
“traditional business model” of selling furniture on credit still remained in place to some 
degree, in contrast with the more familiar worldwide scenario where “all risk of nonpayment 
is transferred to the credit card companies” (Cohen 2004:18). The case of Richard Madihlaba 
suggests, however, that it was becoming more prevalent to get into hock to clothing retailers 
via storecards, and to micro-lenders (in his case to buy an electrical appliance), than by 
buying furniture from retailers on hire purchase. Many such retailers – such as members of 
the JD group —had recently branched out into financial services and micro-lending as an 
equally or more profitable aspect of the business.
16
 Lending was becoming increasingly 
financialized, and customers’ being banked meant less risk to creditors than under the 
traditional business model.   
 
Money enclaves 
 
It was the numerous phone calls Richard received from RCS “to say ‘when are you coming to 
pay us?’ ” that drove him to borrow from the further micro-lender, SA Loans, “to get money 
to pay them” (Fig 4). The almost universal spread of mobile phones makes it unnecessary to 
send out “brown envelopes” and makes borrowers easier to target by lenders and advertisers 
of all sorts. What makes his experience of the financial sector quintessentially modern, then, 
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is creditors’ ready access to him: either recouping repayment by direct debit or, in the case of 
some of the smaller lenders, by telephoning him to remind him of his debts.  
 
This case reveals how the attempted undoing of credit apartheid involved a concerted effort 
by various agencies, including financial institutions themselves, to “bank the unbanked”. 
Expanding business so as to include both “those at the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad 
2004) and those who, even if not as poor, had been politically disenfranchised, it was claimed 
that access to financial products would benefit them (Krige 2011:142; Porteous with 
Hazelhurst 2004:4-6). Attempting more effectively to reach prospective clients, South 
Africa’s banking sector intensified its efforts, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, to reach 
those parts of the market heretofore reluctant to use its services. While this initially involved 
various banks competing with each other in search of greater profit, the state later intervened, 
requiring all banks, in the early 2000s, to sign the Financial Sector Charter and to provide a 
basic savings and transmission account, known as Mzansi, intended for the poorest: including 
even those without a regular income. After market research concluded that banks seemed to 
be intimidating, and that tellers were unable to speak any language other than English or 
Afrikaans, new branches were set up in urban townships and later in rural areas. It was done 
at relatively low cost, in part by switching all money transfers to ATMs, hiring staff to show 
new customers how to use these, and abolishing the uniquely South African bank charges 
normally made on every transaction (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004). 
 
My fieldwork showed, however, that those in need of banking facilities have long been aware 
and have made use of them, commonly combining the use of formal banks for savings and 
transmission purposes with that of hire purchase arrangements and informal money-
borrowing in order to pay for things in advance. Though credit apartheid was widespread, it 
did not necessarily prevent black people from opening bank accounts. Households were using 
separate monies and had complex portfolios and multiple strategies (Collins 2005; see also 
Zelizer 1995). Opening an account was commonplace, especially for men of an older 
generation who worked on the mines or in industry. Later, they were joined by a younger 
generation of women. Some holders of the new Mzansi account have simply added this to 
their existing portfolio of bank accounts which they had opened several years, or even 
decades, earlier. 
 
But bank accounts were often used for saving, in a manner that hindered rather than enabled 
an easy flow of money. The opening and closing of successive accounts often paralleled other 
time-specific patterns or reflected spatial disjunctures. Such jerky discontinuities went hand-
in-hand with the stops and starts in an uneven history of employment, paralleled the 
geographical distances of South Africa’s migrant system, accompanied the switch from one 
spouse to another, or reflected the domestic distrust that went along with more stable albeit 
conflicted relationships. Bank accounts were, in effect, single—rather than multiple-use, and 
it was often for the way they blocked, rather than enabled, the ready flow of money that they 
were specifically deployed.  
 
Their use was combined with other arrangements, often intricate and requiring considerable 
skill and powers of recall to manipulate and manage. People with commitments to kin or 
spouses made their money inaccessible by putting it in fixed deposits, by arranging with their 
employers to help them commit to enforced savings practices (Krige 2011:137, see Zelizer 
1995), by putting money aside with a retailer in the “lay-by” system —making a deposit on 
an item in the expectation of paying the rest of the price within a set time period or forfeiting 
the deposit (Roth 2004:72),
17
 or indeed by paying installments for furniture on hire purchase. 
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A rurally-based male migrant of an older generation than Richard Madihlaba, Ace Ubisi, 
worked on the mines, where at month-end he was given a pay-slip to submit to the “time 
office”, exchanging it for cash. He deposited some in a building society account in order to 
put it aside, later drawing this out to buy telegraph orders which he sent home and which his 
wife redeemed at the local Post Office. When he later separated from his wife and fathered 
children with a new partner, he opened up a different account with Standard Bank which he 
used to send money back.  
 
Although the experience of urban informants resident in Soweto (Fig 2) is characterized by 
fewer extremes of geographical distance, similar discontinuities are nonetheless evident. 
Bank accounts were opened when jobs were secured, later becoming dormant when they 
were lost. The conflicting demands on the income of men and women, and associated 
disagreements about household responsibilities, sometimes necessitated the fencing-off of 
wealth stores. Dinah Zulu’s mother, for example, kept an account separate from that of her 
father. He, a truck driver, was the family’s principle wage earner, with his wages being paid 
into his Saambou account, but he was described by Dinah as prone to drunkenness and as 
failing to meet his obligations. Frequently unable to gain access to his wages, his wife, like 
many women of her age and generation, earned a peripatetic living beyond the wage sector 
(Bozzoli with Nkotsoe 1991), making ready cash by selling cooked food to punters at the 
racecourse. Her bank account with Standard served a dual purpose: it allowed her to deposit 
her earnings so as to save part of them, and enabled her to pay the installments on the various 
items of furniture which she bought, successively, on hire purchase and paid off one-by-one 
over the course of her working life.  
 
While the case of Dinah’s parents reveals how marriage partners, concerned about each 
other’s reliability, used bank accounts to ring-fence earnings in the 1970s, her own story 
illustrates that couples even under less discordant circumstances—as they do anywhere—kept 
their finances separate. Her husband, a policeman, earned a monthly salary paid into his bank 
account. Dinah had no formal job, but earned a separate income as an informal tailor. Like 
many non-wage-earning women, she used a stokvel/savings clubs as a means to save, store, 
gain intermittent access to, and distribute money. Under the new dispensation, she 
acknowledged, “the banks do allow you to have an account – the Mzansi account is for 
people who are not working”, but told me “I did once open an Mzansi account, but I don’t 
have money to put in it.”18   
 
Migrant labourers and low-paid wage-earners were thus using the banks in ways that 
reflected a variety of relational, marital, spatial and educational discontinuities. Countering 
the patchy unevenness of these arrangements, increasing numbers of employers during the 
1990s had started to pay wages or salaries into bank accounts, with civil servants in particular 
being paid via the state payroll system, Persal (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:77, 81). In the 
course of the 1990s, the Department of Social Welfare, in an effort to enable regularity of 
payment, similarly encouraged those receiving pensions and social welfare grants to open 
accounts (Breckenridge 2005; Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:50-53). Where banking had 
previously been used to keep income streams separate and strategically to avoid certain social 
obligations while fulfilling others, it increasingly began to enable the unimpeded flow of 
money —from salary or social grant —into the account at month-end, and out of it again. 
Wages paid directly into employees' bank accounts enable employees, in effect, to “borrow 
without collateral” or “use their expected wages as a collateral substitute” (Roth 2004: 78).  
What were wealth stores have gradually become wealth conduits, enabling creditors of all 
kinds to take what is owed to them using the techniques and technologies outlined earlier.  
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Informal moneylending 
 
The one kind of debt that does not feature in Richard Madihlaba’s account is that to informal 
moneylenders. He may have been too cautious to take out such a loan at the prevailing 
interest rate of 50% per month, but it is equally possible that he had done so but concealed it 
from his debt counselor. It is borrowing from mashonisas that evokes some of the 
ambiguities of debt most poignantly. The term sekoloto (debt) denotes a labor contract with 
no end, a form of enslavement. But borrowers, rather than holding moneylenders responsible 
for their misery, often lay the responsibility squarely on their own shoulders for having been 
unable to curb their own consumption. “You are a beggar,” says one, pointing to the flexible 
terms and reasonable interest rates when compared, for example, with that charged by 
furniture stores for hire purchase, and to the speed with which a loan can be procured. “You 
have asked for help so you can’t argue.” On the other, people eventually come to resent their 
own enslavement, or denounce the weakness of relatives for allowing themselves to enter into 
such long-term dependencies. The initial self-blame can turn to anger.  
 
Becoming widespread in the 1980s and particularly from the mid-1990s onwards when credit 
apartheid was coming to an end (Siyongwana 2004),this kind of moneylending with interest 
acquired financialized techniques, aping those being used in the new micro-lending sector 
(Fig 3, (2)) which were to be outlawed at the end of that decade. What have here become 
habituated arrangements involve a combination of willing engagement and resentment by 
borrowers. Lenders ask them for their ATM cards as loan security. After withdrawing the 
money owed to them on payday, lenders return these to their owners. Whereas banks and 
regulated lenders require a “payslip” before agreeing to offer credit, informal lenders do the 
equivalent after the event, by taking the borrower’s card and withdrawing the money owed to 
them directly from the bank. Typically, borrowers, shorter of money than previously, then 
borrow again, once again voluntarily yielding up their ATM cards. When borrowers 
nonetheless tried to escape by cancelling their ATM cards at the bank and applying for new 
ones, lenders, aware that it is impossible to get a new ATM card without an ID book, 
retaliated by asking to keep borrowers’ ID books as well.  
 
My fieldwork in Impalahoek (see Fig 1) revealed a local account of these developments. 
Initiated by a white farmer in the late 1980s, moneylending in and around the village began 
when farm employees started approaching their employer —not directly but, as paternalistic 
custom dictates, via the farm foreman (induna) —to lend them money from their wages in 
advance of payday. The induna, advising his employer to charge interest at the rate of 20% 
per month – by then the going rate in township communities – later inserted himself as an 
agent and charged for the service. “At first they used to pay R20 interest for R100 but when 
time went on they paid R50 … the other R30 was for the agent.” The rate of interest thus rose 
to 50% per month, which is where it remains for larger moneylenders. The agent/induna 
pocketed the difference, using the proceeds to lend money in his own right, eventually 
quitting his farm job to become the pre-eminent moneylender in the area, using the ATM 
technique to secure his loans. The middleman/agent in this account, initially with little 
financial muscle of his own, thus used his wily knowledge of township practice and his 
intermediary status to set up business on his own account.  
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When such agents became moneylenders, they in turn acquired new agents who themselves 
set up independently. A local air force employee, who borrowed from this lender to pay for a 
family funeral, took 6 years to pay off the loan of R10,000, during which time he was 
“working for” the lender who kept his ATM card throughout. At the end of this period he 
“worked for” the mashonisa in a different capacity, becoming an agent who, unknown to his 
“employer”, colluded with customers in order to make greater profits for himself. After this 
was discovered and he was “dismissed”, he set up as a mashonisa on his own. The business 
was so successful that it enabled him to leave the air force, buy a car, build a well-appointed 
house, and send his children to private schools. “He started as a borrower, now he is a 
lender”, said Ace Ubisi, who told me this story. Several lenders were, like him, in state 
employ and were effectively “reinvesting” their state salaries (James 2012).  
 
Informal moneylending has, however, been practiced in South African rural villages and 
township areas alike for at least 50 years. Several accounts of this practice take a sympathetic 
view of the lender and acknowledge the interdependence and mutually reinforcing character 
of borrowing and lending (Krige 2011; Roth 2004; Siyongwana 2004). While acknowledging 
that structural factors limit householders’ options to borrow from the formal sector at 
reasonable rates, thus driving them towards illegal moneylenders instead, these accounts also 
show that such loans may be cheaper than those available from the formal sector, especially 
given that the administrative costs and the risks of non-repayment are considerable (Roth 
2004:52). Small-scale and neighborhood lenders' connection to borrowers also serves to cap 
the interest rate. Given that loans are intended to be repaid at month end, no escalation will be 
calculated even in the case of default: doing so would make repayment increasingly difficult; 
give the lender a reputation for unfairness and increase the chances that violence be used 
against him; and prompt complaints to the authorities. Community-mindedness thus 
converges neatly with careful calculation in these lending arrangements (Krige 2011:154-8). 
The local mashonisa has an embeddedness in community arrangements which, alongside her 
desire to stay in business, controls the terms under which repayment is sought.  
 
While moneylending of this kind has long been pervasive in urban townships and small-town 
settings in the former homelands (James 2012; Krige 2011: 136-81; Roth 2004), and while 
borrowers and lenders cannot be easily separated, since people may do both at once (James 
2012; Servet and Saiag 2013; Guerin, this volume), the rise of the more professional and big-
time moneylenders has given pause to analysts and economists. In 2004 it was estimated that 
30,000 such lenders were active, and that black lenders were borrowing more from them, at 
injurious rates, than they were from formal institutions (Ardington et al 2004:619). 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
Under South Africa’s new democracy, stringent efforts were and are being made to 
incorporate those previously politically disenfranchised and create a single economic 
framework from a dual one. In such a setting, debt has complex meanings. For those better 
off and more aspirational than Richard Madihlaba, among them the new swathe of civil 
servants and state employees who constitute South Africa’s “new middle class” (Southall 
2004), the obligation to invest in social and conjugal relations brought with it proportional 
expenditure as well as further commitments entailed in novel visions of value. Expectations 
and hopes, of higher education for children, of support for less well-off relatives (Stauffer 
2010), have increased exponentially, out of proportion to the incomes which are supposed to 
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underpin them. If responding to these aspirations entailed borrowing “speculative resources” 
from “the future”, this need not necessarily, however, be seen as leading to unsustainable 
crisis. After all, it was credit – the “good” meaning of debt (Peebles 2010:226) – that, at least 
in part, enabled the very growth of this new middle class.  The positive social consequences, 
at least in some cases, were outweighing or at least counterbalancing the negative ones. 
 
Even for borrowers like Richard, indebtedness was the result of prudence rather than either 
impoverishment or profligacy, and was leveraged as a strategy for individual self-
actualisation in a setting of extensive communal obligations rather than irrational 
consumption. But the negative consequences of the debts which took him to the counselor 
seemed to be outweighing whatever social worth they might have been taken out to achieve. 
Indebtedness, here, had a potential to produce new forms of oppression and 
disenfranchisement in place of the older ones it had replaced.  
 
The onset of borrowing possibilities that were unleashed by South Africa’s credit/debt 
revolution produced a peculiarly mediated kind of capitalism. Many of those who lend money 
borrow it as well; conversely, borrowers are also lenders. This paper has shown some of the 
underpinnings and contradictory aspects of the situation, illustrating how difficult it is to 
separate bad from good protagonists or perpetrators from victims. The broader backdrop is 
one in which the sometimes contradictory forces of state and market have intertwined to 
create a redistributive neoliberalism, in which people at all levels attempt to make “money 
from nothing” (James 2014). As the banks did with the poor housing purchasers in the sub-
prime mortgage market in the US, so a far wider spectrum of lenders does to a wider 
spectrum of borrowers in this setting: gaining access to the money—however small the 
amount—of the widest possible range of people is essential to generate profit in a system 
based more on consumption and rent-seeking than production. 
 
But the fact that so many intermediaries have a stake in the existing system does not simply 
mean business as usual. Banking with and borrowing from banks, buying appliances on the 
never-never, and asking neighbourhood lenders for loans, are present-day practices set 
against the longer-term arrangements which were institutionalized by credit apartheid: 
arrangements that have left an indelible stamp on their later versions. Householders, 
intermediaries, repossession agents, and moneylenders all play roles premised on these older 
models. In its earlier incarnation, this peculiarly South African version of finance, while 
formally excluding people, simultaneously left open a variety of possibilities. Borrowers 
might “juggle” various options, using enforced methods of saving such as stokvels or hire 
purchase to escape obligations in one register while fulfilling those in another.  Many of these 
options were mediated through the highly personalized relationships that were struck up 
between clients on the one hand and repossession agents, fly-by-night “scammers”, or 
informal moneylenders’ apprentices on the other. All were ready to collude with customers 
against the big operators, banks, and companies which were gradually extending greater 
access—but always on prejudicial terms.  
 
Although produced within the severe constraints of credit apartheid, these forms of collusion, 
alongside the community embeddedness of credit relationships, had earlier given debtors 
some flexibility about repayment and even allowed some temporarily to escape their 
obligations. In credit post-apartheid, increasingly financialized technologies, albeit combined 
with informalized relationships, have begun enabling creditors to pursue debtors with greater 
ease than previously. Credit post-apartheid, while retaining some features associated with its 
forerunner, credit apartheid, has a more uniform and streamlined character. Getting “deeper 
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into a hole” may represent things from this negative perspective alone, and thus show only 
one side of the picture. But it does encompass an important aspect of the deeply ambivalent 
feelings about entrapment which black South Africans, or certain among their number, 
experience in the face of debt.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 The South African economy rapidly liberalized in the late 1990s and early 2000s as well as 
becoming extensively financialized. This, in the absence of investment in manufacturing and 
production, has been seen as accounting for South Africa’s “jobless growth” during that 
period (Marais 2011: 124-8, 132-9). 
2
 I use “black” to denote the members of Bantu language groups, now often termed 
“indigenous,” who were at the bottom of the social ladder under apartheid. I do this is in 
contrast with older South African practice, which terms them “African” but misleadingly 
suggests that other inhabitants of the country are “non-African.”   
3
 The Zulu word mashonisa relates to the verb stems –shona (to sink, become poor, die) and –
shonisa (to impoverish, cause to become poor) (Dent and Nyembezi 1969:481). It may be 
translated as “one who impoverishes” or who “takes and continues to take indefinitely” 
(Krige 2011:144). In popular parlance the plural is mashonisas (Krige 2011:151; Siyongwana 
2004:851).   
4
 The debt abyss lures more SA consumers, Business Day, 26 Feb 2008. 
5
 Ambiguities that have dogged attempts to characterize, pigeonhole and analyze the “black 
middle class” are too extensive to cover here in detail; see James (2014) for a longer 
discussion. For accounts of how the black middle class consolidated within the public sector 
in the 1990s, see Crankshaw (2005); Southall (2004:533; 2012); Seekings and Nattrass 
(2005:312). 
6
 For related points in the case of Ghana, see Breckenridge (2010:649-50, 655). 
7
 Debt review was aimed in particular at cases like those described below, involving amounts 
of less than R50,000, which were ineligible for the very expensive process of bankruptcy or 
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sequestration (termed “insolvency” in South Africa). “If a debtor is insolvent but he or she 
cannot put up the funds to apply for the proper relief in terms of the Insolvency Act or cannot 
proof advantage to creditors, a sequestration order that would eventually lead to a discharge 
of debt, would be out of reach of such a debtor.” (Boraine and Roestorf 2002:4). Debt review 
was intended to give debtors some respite from harassment by creditors, allowing them to 
reschedule debts and make payments while preventing further indebtedness. The counselor 
identifies the client’s needs to identify the amount that they need to live, setting aside this 
amount before deciding on a realistic set of repayments to be offered to credit providers. The 
debtor, once officially under debt review, must be allowed 60 days’ grace from creditors’ 
demands before the final schedule of payments must be agreed and put into practice. For 
more detail on the regulation, see James (2013).  
8
 The philosophy of Gabriel Davel, the regulator at the time, was that “regulation works best 
when it persuades players in the industry to accept responsibility for their own decisions” 
(Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:94). Much effort was expended by state and non-state actors 
in implementing systems of financial education and “wellness” in order to persuade 
borrowers to do this. 
9
 For garnishee abuse, see Haupt and Coetzee (2008); Haupt et al (2008); (James 2013); for 
the Marikana miners, see Lynley Donnelly, “NCR raises alarm at unsecured lending in 
Marikana,” Mail and Guardian, 11 October 2012; Chantelle Benjamin, “Ghastly garnishee 
abuse exposed,” Mail and Guardian, 30 November 2012; “Editorial: grapple garnishee 
ghoul,” Mail and Guardian, 30 November 2012; Keith Breckenridge, “Revenge of the 
Commons: the crisis in the South 
African mining industry,” History Workshop Online 5 November 2012. 
http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/revenge-of-the-commons-the-crisis-in-the-south-african-
mining-industry/ accessed 23 December 2013. 
10
 For a US example in similar vein, see Williams (2004). 
11
 The term lobola has become degrammaticized in its transformation into general slang or 
township lingo. The strictly correct form in isiZulu would be ilobolo. 
12
 For similar ring-fencing of funds, see Ferguson (1992) on Lesotho. 
13
 At the time of research, R8 (South African Rand) = $1 (USD). 
14
 For exchange rate see footnote 12, above. 
15
 Krige (2011) gives an extensive discussion of the background of “credit apartheid”, 
especially  in Chapter 4. 
16
 ‘The JD Group’, Carte Blanche, MNet, 25 March 2007, 
http://beta.mnet.co.za/carteblanche/Article.aspx?Id=3279&ShowId=1, accessed 31 January 
2013. 
17
 While this and other similar practices by retailers have been  decried for their exploitative 
character, such criticisms have not taken into consideration the canny manner in which they 
are often used: householders have shown a strategic awareness of the advantages to be gained 
from economic formality (Krige 2011:137). 
18 Maarten Mittner, “Mzansi accounts flop”, Sake24.com, 9 June 2010. 
